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While members of the journalistic and legal communities have
debated for more than two decades whether or not the news media
should publish the names of sex-crime victims, the level of discussion
has increased in the last decade. The Des Moines Register's receipt of
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a Pulitzer Prize for a series of articles in which a rape victim was
named and photographed,' as well as public criticism of the New York
Times for its profile of Patricia Bowman, who accused William
Kennedy Smith of rape,' have helped propel the issue to the forefront
of journalists' discussions about ethics.' Both journalists and their
critics tend to focus on what journalists should do after they acquire
victims' names. Some commentators say journalists should publish
sex-crime victims' names because doing so promotes truth and helps
reduce the stigma of the crime.' Others say journalists cannot write
about sex-crime victims without tainting them, consequently making
future victims reluctant to report the crimes against them.
The matter of what journalists can do was largely settled in the
1970s, when the United States Supreme Court held in Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn7 that the media could not be punished for printing the
names of sex-crime victims when reporters obtained those names from
public court documents.' The Cohn Court held that official court
records are of public interest and that the public benefits from the
reporting of true contents of these records.9  The press should
therefore not be punished for merely republishing information already
available in court documents. The Court stated:
We are reluctant to embark on a course that would make public
records generally available to the media but forbid their publication
if offensive to the sensibilities of the supposed reasonable man.
Such a rule would make it very difficult for the media to inform
citizens about the public business and yet stay within the law. The
rule would invite timidity and self-censorship and very likely lead
to the suppression of many items that would otherwise be published
and that should be made available to the public.1"
Rape Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1991, at A6.
2. See Jane Schorer, It Couldn't Happen To Me: One Woman's Story, DES MOINES
REGISTER, Feb. 25 - Mar. 1, 1990, at IA (series of five articles).
3. Fox Butterfield & Mary B.W. Tabor, Woman in Florida Rape Inquiry Fought Adversity
and Sought Acceptance, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1991, at A17.
4. Naming Names, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 29, 1991, at 26.
5. See Gartner, supra note 1, at 1133; Geneva Overholser, Why Hide Rapes?, N.Y. TIMES,
July 11, 1989, at A19.
6. See Benedict, supra note 1, at 1145; McGlashan, supra note 1, at 20; M.K. Guzda, A right
to privacy?, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Mar. 10, 1984, at 7.
7. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
8. Id. at 496-497.
9. Id. at 495.
10. Id. at 496.
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In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court qualified the Cohn decision,
holding that absent a "state interest of the highest order," the press
could not be punished for publishing sex-crime victims' names (or
other truthful information) when that information was legally
obtained." The Court did not explain what might constitute a "state
interest of the highest order," and thus far, no court has articulated a
circumstance which meets that criteria.12
However, the courts have not left sex-crime victims completely at
the media's mercy. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that "[w]here
information is entrusted to the government, a less drastic means than
punishing truthful publication almost always exists for guarding against
the dissemination of private facts."13  While the state in most
circumstances cannot keep the media from publishing sex-crime
victims' names once reporters have obtained them, it may make a
reasonable effort to prevent reporters from acquiring those names. 4
Accordingly, nearly two dozen states have attempted to protect sex-
crime victims' privacy by enacting legislation that allows public
officials to withhold information about the victim from the press and
public.'" These laws vary in scope. Some protect sex-crime victims'
identities during all stages of the police investigation and judicial
proceedings;' 6 but many apply only to certain public documents or
11. The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989).
12. Some lower courts have decided privacy cases involving the news media's identification
of sex-crime victims on constitutional grounds, while others have applied the common law. In
nearly all cases, the reasoning of the final appellate decisions followed that outlined by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Cox. See Ayers v. Lee Enters. Inc., 561 P.2d 998, 1003 (Or. 1977); Poteet v.
Roswell Daily Record, Inc., 584 P.2d 1310, 1312 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978); Macon Tel. Publ'g Co.
v. Tatum, 436 S.E.2d 655, 657 (Ga. 1993); State v. Globe Communications Corp., 648 So. 2d
110, 112-114 (Fla. 1994); Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 474-475 (Tex. 1995).
13. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 534.
14. Laws restricting the press's access to sex-crime victims' names must be narrowly tailored
and narrowly applied. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-607
(1982) (holding that where the state denies the press access to a criminal trial, "it must be shown
that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to
serve that interest.").
15. ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.140 (Michie 1995); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4434 (West
1995); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54961 (West 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.56 (West 1995); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-12 (Michie 1995); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 24C (Law. Co-op. 1996);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.758 (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-5-311 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 81-1842 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.3772-200.3774 (Michie 1995); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2930.07 (Anderson 1995); TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 57.02 (West 1996); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-38-6 (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-11.2 (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 42.17.310 (1995); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-106 (Michie 1995).
16. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.56 (West 1995); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 24C (Law. Co-
op. 1996); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.3772-200.3774 (Michie 1995); TEX. CODE CRIM. P.
ANN. art. 57.02 (West 1996).
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only until the victim testifies at trial.17 In four states, the law only
protects child sex-crime victims' identities.'"
This Article looks at the enactment and subsequent nullification
of a 1992 Washington law that state legislators intended to protect the
privacy of child sex-crime victims. 19 The Article uses this statute to
illustrate that through the enactment of such statutes, politicians may
sacrifice constitutional rights, such as freedom of the press and access
to government proceedings, in order to achieve short-term political
gains. Therefore, because it is somewhat less affected by elections and
the political process, the judiciary is often the only branch of govern-
ment responsible for protecting civil liberties. In the case of Washing-
ton's law on access to child sex-crime victims' names, politicians
sought to curry favor by eliminating public and press access to court
proceedings. Washington courts blocked the legislators' efforts, in the
process issuing important statements about the value of openness in
government.
Part I of this Article provides a history of the controversy in
Washington over the Shelton-Mason County Journal's publication of
child sex-crime victims' names. Part II explains how this controversy
led to the passage of a victim identification law that eliminated public
and press access to court proceedings and documents in cases involving
child sex-crime victims. The passage of this law resulted in a lawsuit
by Washington media, who claimed their ability to monitor and report
on court proceedings was severely damaged. Part III discusses the
media's lawsuit. Part IV explores the Washington Supreme Court's
rationale in overturning the victim identification law, reviewing
precedents and detailing the court's decision. Finally, Part V of this
Article discusses the historical importance of access to government
proceedings and documents and explains why the judiciary historically
has been more protective of the right to access than the legislature.
17. ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.140 (Michie 1995); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54961 (West 1995);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-12 (Michie 1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.758 (1994); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 44-5-311 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1842 (1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2930.07 (Anderson 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-6 (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-11.2
(Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.310 (1995); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-106 (Michie
1995).
18. IOWA CODE § 910A.13 (1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A § 288 (West 1995);
N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:82-46 (1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37.8.5 (1995). North Dakota protects
the identities of child victims of all crimes. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-35-03 (1995).
19. Substitute House Bill 2348, 52nd Leg., Confidentiality of Identity of Child Victims of
Sexual Abuse, ch. 188, 1992 Wash. Laws 818 (hereinafter S.H.B. 2348].
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT IN MASON COUNTY
The Shelton-Mason County Journal (the Journal), located in
Washington's rural Olympic Peninsula, has the distinction of being
one of the few American newspapers to incite people to such anger that
they passed a law against it.20 The Journal has a policy of printing
the names and testimony of all victims who testify in felony trials in
Mason County Superior Court.2" That includes the names of rape
and child molestation victims.
When publisher Henry Gay bought the Journal in 1966, its policy
on covering Mason County Superior Court was already established2
The newspaper covered all felony trials and reported the names and
testimony of all witnesses. 3 Mason County journalists may have
followed this procedure since the newspaper's establishment in 1888.
In doing research, staff members have come across articles from the
nineteenth century in which crime victims, including sex-crime victims,
were named.24
In the 1960s and 70s, other newspapers that named sex-crime
victims stopped doing so, but the Journal continued.2' Henry's son,
Charles, who has been the newspaper's editor since 1980, explained,
"To change our policy, we feel, would be a dereliction of our journalis-
tic duty, an unfair treatment of defendants and an action that sends
exactly the wrong message to victims that you need to be protected,
you should be ashamed, the world mustn't know of your tragedy."
26
For two decades, the Journal continued its policy with little
trouble. The 9,400-circulation weekly covered a sex-crime trial
perhaps once a year or once every eighteen months.27 A few people
20. Id. This law was aimed at the Shelton-Mason County Journal. See Confidentiality of
Identity of Child Victims of Sexual Abuse, 1992: Public hearing on S.H.B. 2348 Before the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 52nd Leg. (Wash. 1992) [hereinafter Public Hearing on S.H.B. 2348].
21. The Shelton-Mason County Journal's actual policy is to publish the names and testimony
of all witnesses in felony trials in Mason County Superior Court. Victims who testify have the
same legal standing as other witnesses and are treated the same as other witnesses. Interview with




25. Id.; See also Joel Kaplan, State lawmakers are trying to seal key information in sex crimes,
ASNE BULL., July/Aug. 1993, at 14; Joseph F. Pisani, Is it time for us to start naming rape
victims?, ASNE BULL., July/Aug. 1991, at 14-15.
26. Charles Gay, Remarks to the American Civil Liberties Union (May 2,1992) (transcript
available from The Shelton-Mason County Journal).
27. Id.
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would get upset about the use of the victim's name, but the complaints
never lasted long. But, Charles said:
Then came 1985, when there were four sex-offense trials on top of
each other. The anger in the community built after each one
instead of dissipating. Someone called Channel 4 to ask for a
"Town Meeting" on the subject to discredit us, and I agreed to
appear. There followed broadcasts on Nightline and another
national program as well as stories in the New York Times and other
newspapers. We published about 40 letters to the editor on the
subject that year, about 30 of them opposing the policy of covering
trials completely, consistently and fairly.
29
Coverage of the four trials, which were held from May through
July, inflamed the community.3 About 450 people went to the
taping of the Town Meeting television special to protest the Journal's
policy.3 In July, people picketed outside the newspaper's office, and
later in the year, someone organized a letter-writing campaign, asking
about two hundred businesses to pull their advertising from the
Journal.32 The following year, eight hundred community members
signed a petition asking the Journal to change its policy.33
People were not just upset about the use of victims' names; they
also were outraged by the publication of what some considered obscene
material. 4 The Journal includes victims' names and testimony. Here
are two accounts of victims' testimony from articles about the 1985
trials:
Kelly testified that in the early morning hours of November
21, he had been forced to have oral and anal sex with George, who
was his cellmate at the time. He said the incident occurred after




30. Interview with Charles Gay, supra note 21.
31. Carolyn Maddux, TV crowd rips Journal policy, SHELTON-MASON COUNTY J., Nov.
14, 1985, at 1.
32. Interview with Charles Gay, supra note 21.
33. Id.; Barbara A. Serrano, New Law A Shield or Gag?-Effort to Protect Child Sex-Crime
Victims Brings Fear of Censorship, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 3, 1992, at Al.
34. Virginia P. Martig, Don't name the defiled, SHELTON-MASON COUNTY J., June 20,
1985, at 4; Stephanie Rice, Does public have right to names?, SHELTON-MASON COUNTY J., June
6, 1985, at 5.
35. Jury convicts inmate of raping his cellmate, SHELTON-MASON COUNTY J., June 27, 1985,
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She said he was holding her down on the bed and had her
knees pushed up to her shoulders while she was trying to push him
away with her hands.
She said while they were struggling, he ejaculated all over her
and the bedding. She said he said, "Whoops." He then, she said,
told her not to tell anyone and got up and left. She said that at one
time during the struggle, he had penetrated her with his finger.36
Distressed by coverage they perceived as harmful to victims,
community members asked the Journal to tone down its coverage. In
a letter to the editor, one woman wrote:
The purpose of testimony in court is to determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused. The repetition by the media of every
lurid detail of that testimony serves no legitimate purpose-it can
only satisfy the morbid curiosity of a minority and can incite into
action those with unhealthy inclinations.37
Another woman wrote:
When will you stop and how far does the public have to go
before you finally stop this scandalous way of running a newspaper?
I think you owe us all an explanation of your reasoning for this type
of policy, when the other newspapers such as the Daily Olympian,
Tacoma and Seattle Times have no such policy. We are not asking
you to change your newspaper, just be more sensitive on these issues
and stop printing the names and addresses of these people who have
suffered enough.3"
The Gays, however, stood firm. They would not change the
Journal's policy.39 "It's absolutely a moral issue," Charles said.4"
The Gays made two main arguments to support their position. First,
designating a person as a victim and giving them anonymity before a
verdict is rendered implies that the person accused is guilty.4 1 That
is unfair, Charles Gay said, given that our justice system is supposed
to presume innocence until a person is found guilty.42 Second,
concealing the names of sex-crime victims implies they have done
36. Juryfnds man guilty of rape, SHELTON-MASON COUNTY J., May 16, 1985, at 5.
37. Martig, supra note 34, at 4.
38. Rice, supra note 34, at 5.
39. Serrano, supra note 33, at Al.
40. Interview with Charles Gay, supra note 21.
41. Journal testimony at committee hearing, SHELTON-MASON COUNTY J., Jan. 23, 1992.
at 4.
42. Id.; Interview with Charles Gay, supra note 21.
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something wrong or have something to be ashamed of 43 In a series
of editorials, Henry Gay, who still serves as the paper's publisher,
explained the Gays' position:
From the beginning, a rape case is a trail of male
cliches--original sin, jail bait, slice off a cut loaf, asked for it, man
trap, damaged goods, poor little thing, pitiful creature and fallen
woman. And at the end of the trail is the Big Daddy newspaper
editor with his unctuous promise, "Don't worry, little lady. No one
will find out from me that you're ruined forever."
We don't believe that rape victims are ruined forever. The
term, damaged goods, is repugnant to us. We won't accept the
description or the cruel premise on which it is founded. And we
cannot understand why family and friends of the victim accept this
atrocious, damaging indictment which is the good old boys' ultimate
power play against women."
Eventually, the furor faded, and business continued as usual at the
Journal. Only nine people had canceled their subscriptions, and the
letter-writing campaign to advertisers generated only one letter from an
advertiser who said he would think about withdrawing his business if
the Journal continued to print rape victims' names. 45 The Journal is
the only source of local news and advertising for Mason County's
39,000 residents, Charles noted.46 People may cancel their subscrip-
tions or advertising in anger, but eventually they cool down and come
back.47 "People realize that this is not something that's in the paper
every week, and people realize it doesn't happen very often. And they
understand we're standing up for principles we believe in."4
II. THE PROPOSAL AND PASSAGE OF WASHINGTON'S
"RAPE ID" LAW
Mason County residents may have understood the Gays' position,
but that understanding did not curb their desire to protect the
community's children. Parents of young sexual assault victims tried
for years to persuade state legislators from Mason County to do
something about the Journal's policy, but legislators were reluctant to
43. Journal testimony at committee hearing, supra note 41, at 4.
44. Henry Gay, Editorial, It's time to right the wrong, SHELTON-MASON COUNTY J., June
13, 1985, at 4.
45. Interview with Charles Gay, supra note 21.
46. Id.
47. Id.; See also Serrano, supra note 33, at Al.
48. Interview with Charles Gay, supra note 21.
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take on the press.49 The 1990 elections, however, resulted in a
significant turnover in the state legislature.50 Shelton parents found
their new state representative, Democrat Tim Sheldon, sympathetic to
their plight. "I just think it's wrong to put kids' names in the paper,"
said Sheldon, who has a young daughter." He knew that people had
tried to no avail to persuade the Gays to change their policy.5 2 When
parents approached him, he said, "I'll just write a bill and see if it
works." 3
It was a good time for Sheldon and his constituents to make a
move. Liberal Democrats had dominated the Washington House of
Representatives for years.54  "Throughout the 1980s, the House
established a reputation for promoting some of the most progressive
social and environmental legislation in the country."55 But in 1990,
voters elected more conservative members of both parties.5 6 In 1992,
the Democrats faced a difficult election and the impending loss of two
party leaders, Governor Booth Gardner and House Speaker Joe King,
who were not running for re-election."s Attempting to please voters,
legislators proposed plenty of "hero bills" that targeted socially
unpopular, politically weak groups.5" Many of these bills, while
restricting civil rights, addressed problems, such as drunk driving and
gang violence, that touched people's nerves. 9
"[Legislators] are trying to be responsive to what they perceive as
complaints from home," Representative Mike Riley said at the time.
"But I think there is the underlying concern that they will be perceived
as soft on crime if they try to rely on the Bill of Rights."6"
Sheldon introduced his bill on January 15, 1992.61 Its main
provisions included the following: (1) Law enforcement agencies
cannot release information identifying child victims of sexual assault to
49. Telephone Interview with Tim Sheldon, State Representative (D-Shelton) (Apr. 10,
1996).
50. Barbara A. Serrano & Jim Simon, Olympia's Right Turn-Democrats Retreat Before
Conservative Agenda, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 15, 1992, at Al.
51. Telephone Interview with Tim Sheldon, supra note 49.
52. Id.
53. Id.




58. Annie Capestany, Rights Come Under Attack in Olympia as Lawmakers Ponder Volatile
Issues, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 11, 1992, at B7.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. S.H.B. 2348, ch. 188, 52nd Leg., 1992 Wash. Laws 818.
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the press or public without permission of the child or the child's legal
guardian. Identifying information includes the child's name, address,
photograph, location and, where the child is a relative or stepchild of
the alleged perpetrator, identification of the child's relationship to the
perpetrator;62 (2) judges must require observers to keep child victims'
identities a secret during sexual assault trials.63 Reporters who violate
judges' orders may be fined up to five hundred dollars; 64 (3) judges
must ensure that information identifying child victims of sexual assault
is not given to the press or public, and if it is, must prevent the
distribution of that information;6 and (4) portions of court records
that identify child victims of sexual assault must be sealed unless the
identifying information is deleted.
66
A. Passage in the House
The Washington House of Representatives considered the bill first
and approved it fairly quickly. On January 21, 1992, the House
Judiciary Committee held a public hearing on the matter.67 Repre-
sentative Sheldon testified on behalf of the bill along with Mason
County counselors, law enforcement officials and a parent of a child
victim. 6" Their testimony was compelling.
Law enforcement officials said many sex-crime cases in Mason
County are dropped or settled because parents do not want their
children to testify in court and subsequently be identified in the
newspaper.6 9 Victims always ask about publicity, Shelton police
detective Gary Martzell said. "They're always hoping police or the
courts can do something to keep their names out of the paper. ' ' 7
Counselors told the Judiciary Committee that the publicity
interferes with victims' treatment and recovery.7 "Two months ago,
62. S.H.B. 2348, ch. 188, § 2(8), 52nd Leg., 1992 Wash. Laws 819 (codified at WASH.
REV. CODE § 7.69A.020).
63. S.H.B. 2348, ch. 188, § 3(2), 52nd Leg., 1992 Wash. Laws 819 (vetoed by Governor
Gardner, Apr. 2, 1992).
64. S.H.B. 2348, ch. 188, § 3(4), 52nd Leg., 1992 Wash. Laws 820.
65. S.H.B. 2348, ch. 188, § 9, 52nd Leg., 1992 Wash. Laws 826 (held unconstitutional in
Allied Daily Newspapers v. Eikenberry, 121 Wash. 2d 205, 848 P.2d 1258 (1993)).
66. Id.
67. Public hearing on S.H.B. 2348, supra note 20.
68. Id.
69. Sheldon Police Det. Gary Martzell and Victoria Meadows, chief deputy prosecutor for
Mason County, testified. Id.
70. Id.
71. Peggy Zorn, a Shelton family and marriage therapist; Leauri Grindeland, a counselor
at Recovery: AID to Victims of Sexual and Domestic Abuse; and Dawn Larson, a representative
of the Washington Coalition of Sexual Assault Programs, testified. Public hearing on S.H.B. 2348,
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a 14-year-old girl came into our agency to talk about being sexually
abused and raped," recalled Leauri Grindeland, a counselor at
Recovery: AID to Victims of Sexual and Domestic Abuse.
Her uncle molested her for five years, beginning when she was 4
years old. She told me of three other separate sexual assaults all
committed within Mason County. Because she knew that I am
required to report child sexual abuse to the proper authorities, she
chose to speak to me anonymously. She told me her sole reason for
remaining anonymous was because of the Shelton Journal's reporting
policy.72
The father of another sexual assault victim asked to remain
anonymous during his testimony because his daughter had not testified
in court yet, and he still hoped to protect her from publicity. He
stated, "I believe in freedom of the press. And I believe in First
Amendment rights, but I don't believe what the forefathers had in
mind was publishing the names of children and the testimony so they
can and will be chastised by their peers for years to come.
73
Charles Gay testified against the bill along with Roland Thomp-
son, the lobbyist for Allied Daily Newspapers, an organization
representing Washington's daily newspapers, and Jerry Sheehan, the
American Civil Liberties Union's Washington state lobbyist. 7' Gay
explained his belief that victims have nothing to be ashamed of and
that not naming them was unfair to the people on trial. He continued:
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the right to
meet his accuser in public. No law requires the press to practice the
same principle, but we think the defendant should have the same
right on our news pages, as a matter of fairness, when we cover
these open, public trials. Just as we don't let someone attack
another in an unsigned letter to the editor, the Journal doesn't let
anonymous women accuse men of raping them or allow anonymous
juveniles to accuse someone of sexually assaulting them.7"
Thompson and Sheehan told the committee they believed
Sheldon's bill was unconstitutional because it involved prior re-





75. Id. Gay's remarks were printed in the Shelton-Mason County Journal two days later.
Journal testimony at committee hearing, supra note 41, at 4.
76. Public hearing on S.H.B. 2348, supra note 20.
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an individual from publishing, is unconstitutional.77 The prohibition
on prior restraint dictates that the government can punish false,
defamatory publications after they occur, but it cannot prevent
information from reaching the public to begin with.7"
Thompson urged legislators not to pass legislation that would
affect the entire news industry just to regulate one small newspaper.79
"What we're standing on here is a matter of principle," Thompson
told the committee. "I don't condone what the Shelton Journal does.
They're the only newspaper in the state that makes that decision.
They probably account for less than one-tenth of one percent of
circulation in the state of Washington. This problem is peculiar to
that town." 0 If Shelton residents object to the Journal's policy, they
can force the newspaper to change by canceling their subscriptions,
Thompson added." Legal solutions are not the answer. "Once you
institute prior restraint, it's a very difficult thing to stop."82
While Thompson and Sheehan raised pertinent legal issues, their
testimony did not engage people's emotions like the testimony of
parents and counselors had. 3 The House Judiciary Committee
approved the bill on February 4, 1992 with little discussion. 4 A few
committee members expressed concern that the bill might be found
unconstitutional, but they said they would vote for it anyway.8 5 "I
don't like to encroach newspapers' rights or crowd First Amendment
freedoms," committee member Curtis Ludwig said. "But I think the
Shelton publisher leaves me no alternative but to vote for this bill."8"
Committee members clearly had been offended by copies of
Journal articles sent to them. Representative James Hargrove
commented: "There needs to be some responsibility that goes with
those freedoms and perhaps not just in the area of relating victims'
names but in some of the other reporting that goes on in graphic detail
about these types of crimes that I think encourages others, stimulation
of other crimes of that nature. 8
s7
77. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 723 (1931) (holding suspension of future
publications as punishment for previous publications constitutes prior restraint).
78. Id. at 714.











The Washington House of Representatives passed the bill
unanimously on February 18, 1992.8 A month later, several mem-
bers expressed regret for voting for the bill and said they had become
caught up in the emotional aspects of the issue. 9 But others stood
by their decision.90
Representative Michael Heavey expressed the feelings of many
representatives when he said: "It comes down to a balancing of 'do I
want my daughter to be in the paper?' Freedom of speech and the
press are not absolute."9'
B. Passage in the Senate
Meanwhile, Representative Sheldon was having some difficulty
getting the bill through the Senate Law and Justice Committee.92
The House was controlled by members of Sheldon's party, but
Republicans controlled the Senate. Discussing the politics of the issue
later, Sheldon pointed out: "Why would [the Republicans] want to let
some yo-yo freshman get a high-profile bill passed?"93
Others remember the bill's constitutionality being more of an
issue than party politics. 4 Several members of the Law and Justice
Committee were lawyers, who also had lawyers on their staff.95
Newspaper and civil rights lobbyists found these legislators more
receptive to their arguments than those in the House had been. 96 In
the end, however, distaste for the Journal's policy outweighed the
senators' constitutional concerns.97
Senate staff member Susan Carlson, who worked on the bill, said
several of the committee members thought the bill might be found
unconstitutional, but like their peers in the House, they felt compelled
to vote for it because it dealt with child victims. 98 "It would have
been hard for them to say, 'Oh, it's unconstitutional so we're not going
to do anything about it,"' Carlson recalled. 99 In addition, legislators
88. 1992 Wash. Laws 827.
89. Capestany, supra note 58, at B7.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Telephone Interview with Tim Sheldon, supra note 49.
93. Id.
94. Telephone Interview with Roland Thompson, lobbyist for Allied Daily Newspapers
(Apr. 10, 1996); Telephone Interview with Gary Nelson, former state senator (Apr. 10, 1996).
95. Telephone Interview with Susan Carlson, Senate staff member (Apr. 11, 1996).
96. Telephone Interview with Roland Thompson, supra note 94.
97. Id.; Telephone Interview with Susan Carlson, supra note 95.
98. Telephone Interview with Susan Carlson, supra note 95.
99. Id.
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supported Sheldon's cause. "Generally, down here, when you're
talking about victims of crime, the Legislature is fairly sympathetic,"
Carlson noted."0
Several Washington legislators and legislative staff members said
the general rule in the state legislature is that if one likes a bill, but has
doubts about its constitutionality, the proper thing to do is pass it and
let the courts decide. 1 1
During the Senate Law and Justice Committee hearing, one
senator noted dryly, "This is probably unconstitutional. I do realize
that rarely stops us from passing legislation here, but I do think it's at
least worth pointing out."'12
After a brief discussion and a few remarks from Sheldon, the
committee passed the bill even though other committee members also
said they thought it might be found unconstitutional.0 3 In the end,
Thompson said, the bill probably "got two minutes of thought."'"'
The committee had a large agenda that day because the deadline for
bills to be passed out of committee was near, and the senators didn't
have time to hash out legal issues. 05 They would leave that to the
full Senate or the courts.
On March 5, 1992, the day before the Senate was to vote on the
bill, the Journal published an account of the trial of a man who was
found guilty of child rape. 06 As usual, the paper named the ten-
year-old victim and recounted testimony about the incident.0 7 The
article included this passage: "She said three times while her mother
was gone, Chambers came into the bedroom where she was sleeping
and had put his penis inside her. She said it happened three different
nights. She said there was enough light in the bedroom that she could
tell it was him."'0°
100. Id.
101. Id.; Telephone Interview with Pat Shelledy, House staff member (Apr. 10, 1996);
Telephone Interview with Tim Sheldon, supra note 49; Telephone Interview with Gary Nelson,
supra note 94.
102. Confidentiality of Identity of Child Victims of Sexual Abuse, 1992: Hearing on S.H.B.
2348 Before the Senate Law and Justice Comm., 52nd Leg. (Wash. 1992) [hereinafter Senate hearing
on S.H.B. 2348].
103. Id.
104. Telephone Interview with Roland Thompson, supra note 94.
105. Id.; Telephone Interview with Susan Carlson, supra note 95.






Sheldon bought fifty copies of the paper, highlighted the offensive
passages and placed a copy on each senator's desk."°o If the vote
hadn't been assured before, it became so the moment the senators saw
the article. Recalling the floor discussion, Thompson said, "They just
held up the paper and talked about how awful it was."
'" 0
Given the senators' distaste for the Journal's article, the outcome
of their discussion was not surprising. They approved the bill by a
vote of forty-three to five."' Several senators who were attorneys
voted against the bill because they thought it was unconstitutional."'
Senator Phillip Talmadge, an attorney who would later be elected to
the Washington Supreme Court, proposed an amendment on the floor
to try to address some of the bill's problems."' The amendment
would have required prosecutors to make a motion to use a pseudonym
or the victim's initials instead of the victim's name." 4 In ruling on
the motion, judges would have to weigh the victim's rights against
those of the defendant and the public. As written, the bill arguably
made the victim's rights supreme and required judges to take action
without discussion. To nonlawyers, the amendment probably seemed
trivial, but it touched on an issue-mandatory closure-that would
later cause the bill to be declared unconstitutional."'
The Senate rejected Senator Talmadge's amendment twice."
6
According to Senate staff member Carlson, supporting the amendment
would have been politically imprudent." 7 The bill had the backing
of victims' rights organizations and children's advocates, who may not
have accepted what could be seen as a weaker version."' "Some
groups come in that people don't like to vote against," Carlson said,
109. Telephone Interview with Tim Sheldon, supra note 49; Serrano, supra note 33, at Al.
110. Telephone Interview with Roland Thompson, supra note 94.
111. Final Bill Report, S.H.B. 2348, 52nd Leg., at 3 (1992).
112. Sean Hanlon, Senate passes bill to ban use of names, SHELTON-MASON COUNTY J.,
Mar. 12, 1992, at 1.
113. Telephone Interview with Susan Carlson, supra note 95.
114. A copy of the proposed amendment is not included in the state archives. Details about
the amendment and the vote on it were provided by Susan Carlson, who referred to notes in her
files. Telephone Interview with Susan Carlson, supra note 95; See also Hanlon, supra note 112,
at 1.
115. Mandatory closure occurs when the law requires judges to dose the courtroom
whenever a particular circumstance, such as the testimony of a child victim, occurs. Laws can
be written to require closure or to leave closure to the discretion of the presiding judge. If the
rape-victim identification law had been written in a way that left closure to the discretion of
judges, it may have withstood constitutional scrutiny. See Allied Daily -Newspapers v.
Eikenberry, 121 Wash. 2d 205, 211-212, 848 P.2d 1258, 1261-1262 (1993).
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explaining that politicians consider it unwise to vote against bills that
the public sees as helping children.119 Voters tend to like programs
and laws that help children, who are universally appealing.
120
Particularly in an election year, state legislators want to appear to
support the rights of children and families so that they may gain voter
approval and be reelected.12 1
On April 2, 1992, Washington Governor Booth Gardner signed
the bill into law subject to a partial veto.122  He vetoed the sections
of the bill which prohibited the release of identifying information to
anyone other than law enforcement agencies without the victim's
permission, required judges to exact promises from trial observers not
to disclose child victims' identities, and allowed judges to fine reporters
who did publish child victims' names. 23 In his letter to the legisla-
ture, Governor Gardner explained that those sections of the bill were
likely to be found unconstitutional. 124  The rest of the bill was to
become effective on June 11, 1992.125 It included sections requiring
courts and other government agencies to withhold information
identifying child sexual assault victims from the public by sealing or
redacting documents and closing courtroom testimony.
1 26
Several years later, Roland Thompson of Allied Daily Newspapers
said efforts to block the bill's passage in the Washington State
Legislature were fairly futile. 127 Legislators objected to the Journal's
policy and, in an election year, it was difficult for them to vote against
any bill that might help children.1 2' How could they go home and
explain to voters that they had voted against children because of a legal
technicality?129  They might as well ask to be voted out of office.
"The emotions were such that they didn't really care," Thompson said.





121. Cf. Capestany, supra note 58, at B7 (asking, "who would disagree with a bill to protect
young victims of sexual abuse?").
122. Governor Booth Gardner, Veto Message on S.H.B. 2348, 52nd Leg., (Apr. 2, 1992),
1992 Wash. Laws 827.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 1992 Wash. Laws 818.
126. See S.H.B. 2348, ch. 188, 52nd Leg., 1992 Wash. Laws 818.
127. Telephone Interview with Roland Thompson, supra note 94.
128. Id.; Telephone Interview with Susan Carlson, supra note 95.
129. Id.
130. Telephone Interview with Roland Thompson, supra note 94.
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III. THE ALLIED DAILY NEWSPAPERS SUIT AND TRIAL
COURT INJUNCTIONS
Members of the newspaper industry quickly realized that they
could not stop Sheldon's bill in the legislature.' They had a better
chance of challenging the law in the courts."3 2 Thus, even as the bill
was working its way through the House and Senate committees, Allied
Daily Newspapers began preparing a lawsuit. 33
On May 27, 1992, Allied Daily Newspapers filed suit in King
County Superior Court, asking Judge Norman Quinn for an injunction
that would prevent state and county officials from enforcing the new
law.1 34  The Washington Newspaper Publishers Association, which
represents weekly newspapers, and Fisher Broadcasting, joined Allied
Daily Newspapers in the suit. 35  Notably, the Journal was involved
in the suit only to the extent that it is a member of the Washington
Newspaper Publishers Association. During the suit, other newspapers
tried to distance themselves from the Journal.136  They wanted to
make it clear that they were fighting for the First Amendment, not the
unpopular weekly.'37 The Seattle Times editor Mike Fancher wrote
in an editorial in his paper:
In this case, we must defend one newspaper's right to act irrespon-
sibly in order to preserve the underlying principles of our demo-
cracy.
And, there should be no mistake about it-what the Shelton-
Mason County Journal does is wrong. It should stop.
If the Journal keeps printing the names of young victims of
sexual assault, and chances are it will, the appropriate remedy is for
people to stop reading it.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. Allied Daily Newspapers' members include all of Washington state's daily
newspapers. Its partner in the suit, the Washington Newspaper Publishers Association, includes
most of the weekly newspapers in Washington. Thus, the suit included virtually all of the state's
more than 100 newspapers in addition to broadcasting outlets owned by Fisher Broadcasting, Inc.
134. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 5-6, Allied Daily
Newspapers v. Eikenberry (No. 92-2-12149-2) (Superior Court for King County, May 27, 1992)
[hereinafter Plaintiffs' Complaint].
135. Allied Daily Newspapers, 121 Wash. 2d at 208, 848 P.2d at 1259.
136. Interview with Charles Gay, supra note 21; Telephone Interview with Roland
Thompson, supra note 94.
137. Interview with Charles Gay, supra note 21; see also Public Hearing on S.H.B. 2348,
supra note 20.
1997]
Seattle University Law Review
The public should defend the right of a free press to act
irresponsibly, but it needn't support an irresponsible newspaper. 3
A. Main Arguments of the Press and State
Allied Daily Newspapers attacked the new law's constitutionality
on several grounds. Their three main arguments were as follows: (1)
the law violates the media's and the public's right of access to court
proceedings and documents; (2) the law erases the separation of powers
in state government by mandating judicial action; and (3) the law
abridges freedom of speech.1
39
First, Allied Daily Newspapers argued that the law violates the
public's right of access to court proceedings and documents because it
requires judges to close court proceedings and seal documents in which
the victim's name is used.14 At a minimum, judges would have to
close the court during the victim's testimony.' 41  More likely, the
entire trial would be closed. 142 In making this argument, the news-
papers relied largely on statements made by county prosecutors,
particularly those made by Rebecca Roe, a senior deputy prosecutor in
King County.143  After explaining how the law would convolute
judicial procedure by requiring portions of trials to be closed and
documents sealed, Roe said: "Disclosure of the victim's name to the
138. Michael R. Fancher, Editorial, Why We Support Law That Keeps Names Of Victims
Public, SEATTLE TIMES, May 31, 1992, at A2.
139. Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 134 at 4-5; Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in
Support of Their Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 4-20, Allied Daily Newspapers v.
Eikenberry (No. 92-2-12149-2) (Superior Court for King County, May 27, 1992) [hereinafter
Plaintiffs' Memo in Support of Preliminary Injunction]; Plaintiffs' Reply to State's Memorandum
in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 3-9, Allied Daily Newspapers
v. Eikenberry (No. 92-2-12149-2) (Superior Court for King County, June 8, 1992) [hereinafter
Plaintiffs' Reply to State's Memo in Opposition to Preliminary Injunction]; Plaintiffs' Response to
State's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Permanent
Injunction at 2-15, Allied Daily Newspapers v. Eikenberry (No. 92-2-12149-2) (Superior Court
for King County, June 26, 1992) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Response to State's Memo in Opposition to
Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Permanent Injunction].
140. Plaintiffs' Memo in Support of Preliminary Injunction, supra note 139, at 7-9; see also
Brief of Respondents at 11, Allied Daily Newspapers v. Eikenberry, 121 Wash. 2d 205, 848 P.2d
1258 (1992) (No. 59435-0) [hereinafter Brief of Respondents].
141. Plaintiffs' Reply to State's Memo in Opposition to Preliminary Injunction, supra note 139,
at 5.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 5-6; see also Deposition of James C. Townsend at 2, Allied Daily Newspapers




judge and jury, and public spectators, cannot be avoided if we are to
conduct trials honestly.
144
In reply, the State, represented by Attorney General Kenneth
Eikenberry, argued the law did not require judges to close courtrooms
during trials. 41 Judges could order the use of the- victim's initials or
a pseudonym instead of the victim's name. 46  Alternatively, they
could make people attending the trial agree not to disclose the child's
name to others.147  To support its position, the state referred to
statements made by Victoria Meadows, Mason County's chief deputy
prosecutor. Meadows said it was possible to enforce the new law and
still provide adequate public access to court proceedings. 41 She
noted that Mason County already used aliases for victims in documents
and proceedings leading up to trial and added, "Mason County expects
to exclude the press during child victim/witness testimony, but make
available tapes of the testimony, at cost, which have been excised,
deleting the identifying information.
' 14 9
In addition to arguing that the new law interfered with free access
to the courts, Allied Daily Newspapers asserted that the law violated
the separation of powers doctrine because the legislature was telling
judges how to run court proceedings.5 The Washington Supreme
Court had already established guidelines for closing court hearings or
documents.' The media organizations contended that in passing
144. Affidavit of Rebecca J. Roe at 3, Allied Daily Newspapers v. Eikenberry (No. 92-2-
12149-2) (Superior Court for King County, May 27, 1992) [hereinafter Affidavit of Rebecca Roe].
145. State's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction
at 11-13, Allied Daily Newspapers v. Eikenberry (No. 92-2-12149-2) (Superior Court for King
County, June 4, 1992) [hereinafter State's Memo in Opposition to Preliminary Injunction]; See also
Brief of Appellants at 14-15, Allied Daily Newspapers v. Eikenberry, 121 Wash. 2d 205, 848
P.2d 1258 (1992) (No. 59435-0) [hereinafter Brief of Appellants].
146. State's Memo in Opposition to Preliminary Injunction, supra note 145, at 13; see also
Brief of Appellants, supra note 145, at 15-16.
147. State's Memo in Opposition to Preliminary Injunction, supra note 145, at 13.
148. Affidavit of Victoria Meadows at 4, Allied Daily Newspapers v. Eikenberry (No. 92-2-
12149-2) (Superior Court for King County, June 16, 1992) [hereinafter Affidavit of Meadows].
149. Id.
150. Plaintiffs' Memo in Support of Preliminary Injunction, supra note 139, at 16; see also
Brief of Respondents, supra note 139, at 16-19.
151. See Cohen v. Everett City Council, 85 Wash. 2d 385, 388, 535 P.2d 801, 803 (1975)
(recognizing certain exceptional circumstances and conditions which justify some limitations on
open judicial proceedings); Federated Publications, Inc. v. Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d 51, 62-63, 615
P.2d 440, 446 (1980) (holding that pretrial hearings may be closed upon showing of some
likelihood of prejudice to defendant's fair trial rights); Federated Publications, Inc. v. Swedberg,
96 Wash. 2d 13, 20, 633 P.2d 74, 77 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984 (1982) (holding that a
court may order closure to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial); Seattle Times Co. v.
Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d 30, 37-39, 640 P.2d 716, 702-721 (1982) (outlining five factors that courts
must consider before restricting access to criminal hearings or records from hearings).
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Sheldon's bill, the legislature was directing courts to ignore those
guidelines and close any proceedings or seal any documents in which
child victims were identified.'
15 2
In reply to these arguments, the State asserted that the legislature
intended the new law to complement, not replace, the court's guide-
lines."5 3 It noted that under normal circumstances, the public's and
press's right of access to court proceedings would outweigh the victim's
right to privacy.'54 The new law simply assured victims that their
right of privacy would be considered by judges in deciding whether or
not to close proceedings or seal documents.' 5 According to Attorney
General Eikenberry, "[The law] neither states that a child victim's
right to privacy has priority over the rights of others nor requires the
court to protect the child's right to privacy in a constitutionally
impermissible manner."' 56
Third, Allied Daily Newspapers asserted that the bill violated the
press's and public's right to free speech in that judges could require
people to agree not to disseminate victims' names before they were
permitted to attend a trial.'57 This constitutes prior restraint as it
"forces the public and press to accept a violation of their free speech
rights in exchange for exercising their right of access to open jus-
tice."'5 8
In response, the State argued that the First Amendment does not
protect speech involving. information that was improperly obtained.159
Because judges could order attorneys and witnesses to not reveal a
victim's name,160 any violation of this order would result in the
victim's name being improperly released. 161 Judges could then order
152. Plaintiffs' Memo in Support of Preliminary Injunction, supra note 139, at 16-18;
Plaintiffs' Reply to State's Memo in Opposition to Preliminay Injunction, supra note 139, at 3.
153. Brief of Appellants, supra note 145, at 11-12, 19-24; see also State's Memo in Opposition
to Preliminary Injunction, supra note 145, at 18; State's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs'
Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Permanent Injunction at 6-9, Allied Daily Newspapers v.
Eikenberry (No. 92-2-12149-2) (Superior Court for King County) [hereinafter State's Memo in
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Complaint].
154. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 145, at 18-19, 36.
155. Id. at 11.
156. Id. at 14.
157. See Plaintiffs' Memo in Support of Preliminary Injunction, supra note 139, at 15-16;
Plaintiffs' Reply to State's Memo in Opposition to Preliminary Injunction, supra note 139, at 7; see
also Brief of Respondents, supra note 140, at 37-38.
158. Brief of Respondents, supra note 140, at 40.
159. Brief of Appellants, supra note 145, at 29; see also State's Memo in Opposition to
Preliminary Injunction, supra note 145, at 16-17.




reporters not to print the improperly released information.'62 Also,
the State argued, there is no First Amendment issue when people give
up their right to free speech voluntarily in order to attend a trial that
would otherwise be closed.'63 Accordingly, asking people to choose
between agreeing to a gag order or being excluded from a trial did not
constitute a form of coercion.
164
B. Disposition in King County
On June 9, 1992, two days before the new law was to go into
effect, King County Superior Court Judge Norman Quinn issued a
preliminary injunction forbidding both the State Attorney General and
the King County Prosecutor from enforcing the section related to court
proceedings and documents. 165  Judge Quinn said the section was
unconstitutional because it required judges to close court proceedings
and "amount[ed] to the Legislature telling courts what they may admit
as evidence."'1 66
In his decision, Judge Quinn also made the King County
Prosecutor a plaintiff in the suit instead of a defendant.'67 Deputy
prosecutor Virginia Kirk, who represented the prosecutor's office in the
initial hearing, had surprised State attorneys by siding with Allied
Daily Newspapers and saying the new law would interfere with
prosecutors' ability to conduct trials.168
While attorneys for Allied Daily Newspapers were preparing to
argue for a permanent injunction and State attorneys were responding
to Judge Quinn's order, other Washington judges, who were not bound
by Judge Quinn's decision, heard motions involving the new victim
identification law.169  On June 16, 1992, a Yakima County Superior
162. Brief of Appellants, supra note 145, at 26-28.
163. See id. at 27-28.
164. See id.
165. Order Granting Preliminary Injunction at 4, Allied Daily Newspapers v. Eikenberry
(No. 92-2-12149-2) (Superior Court for King County, June 10, 1992) [hereinafter Order Granting
Preliminary Injunction].
166. George Tibbits, Judge Bars Law on Release of Juvenile Sex Crime Names, OREGONIAN,
June 11, 1992, at D15. See generally Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, supra note 165, at 2-3.
167. Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, supra note 165, at 5.
168. Sean Hanlon, Judge Stops Enactment of Law Against Using Names, SHELTON-MASON
COUNTY J., June 11, 1992, at 1-2; see also Defendant Norm Maleng's Memorandum in Response
to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 6, Allied Daily Newspapers v. Eikenberry (No.
92-2-12149-2) (Superior Court for King County, June 4, 1992) [hereinafter Maleng's Memo in
Response to Preliminary Injunction].
169. Because superior courts' jurisdiction is limited, Quinn's decision only affected
government agencies in King County.
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Court judge followed Judge Quinn's ruling and refused to close a child
molestation trial.
170
The same day, Mason County Superior Court Judge James Sawyer
used the new law to close the testimony of an eleven-year-old sex-
crime victim, instructing attorneys to use an alias for her in other
portions of the trial, and to seal any records that would reveal her
testimony.'' David Utevsky, an attorney representing the American
Civil Liberties Union in the case, protested the ruling on behalf of the
Journal, but both the defense attorney and the county prosecutor
agreed to the closure.172  Shortly after Judge Sawyer made his deci-
sion, the defendant pled guilty to a lesser charge.1
7 1
In a declaration later made to the King County court, Utevsky
described the Mason County judge's reasons for closing the trial:
Judge Sawyer emphasized that both the prosecution and the defense
had endorsed the proposed procedure to implement [the new law].
The defendant had waived his right to an open trial, so his rights
were not at issue. Judge Sawyer also concluded that [the law] could
be enforced without violating the public right of access under the
state and federal Constitutions, so long as the court did not restrict
public access to a degree which was not necessary to protect the
alleged victim's right of privacy.171
On June 29, 1992, Judge Quinn permanently enjoined enforce-
ment of the new law. 7 The injunction, however, applied only to
Section 9 of the law, which referred to court proceedings and court
documents. 176  Judge Quinn concluded that by requiring judges to
close traditionally open proceedings and records, Section 9 violated the
Washington State Constitution. 77  Sections of the law that did not
specifically refer to traditionally open judicial proceedings and court
documents were acceptable, Judge Quinn concluded, because they
170. Peter Lewis, Confusion Over New Shield Law--Shelton Judge to Enforce Challenged
Rule, SEATTLE TIMES, June 17, 1992, at B1.
171. Id.; Al Ford, Case Was Almost First One Tried Under No-Names Law, SHELTON-
MASON COUNTY J., June 18, 1992, at 1.
172. Id.; see also Declaration of David Utevsky at 2, Allied Daily Newspapers v. Eikenberry
(No. 92-2-12149-2) (Superior Court for King County, June 26, 1992) [hereinafter Declaration of
Utevsky]; Declaration of Gary P. Burleson at 3, Allied Daily Newspapers v. Eikenberry (No. 92-
2-12149-2) (Superior Court for King County, July 30, 1992) [hereinafter Declaration of Burleson).
173. Ford, supra note 171.
174. Declaration of Utevsky, supra note 172, at 3-4.
175. Declaratory Judgment and Order Granting Permanent Injunction, Allied Daily
Newspapers v. Eikenberry at 3-5 (No. 92-2-12149-2) (Superior Court for King County, June 29,
1992) [hereinafter Declaratory Judgment and Order Granting Permanent Injunction].
176. Id. at 3.
177. Id. at 2-3.
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didn't require closure, although they allowed judges to close proceed-
ings and documents as they saw fit. 7 ' The distinction Judge Quinn
made between the sections eventually would allow the state to keep
part of the law on the books and apply it to such things as police
records and juvenile court proceedings. 79
Immediately after Judge Quinn issued the permanent injunction,
Assistant Attorney General Lee Ann Miller told reporters she would
appeal directly to the state supreme court.18 0
IV. THE WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT NULLIFIES THE
"RAPE ID" LAW
The State appealed Judge Quinn's decision directly to the
Washington Supreme Court. In Allied Daily Newspapers v. Eikenber-
ry, 8 ' the court declared Section 9 of the 1992 law unconstitutional.
In doing so, the court relied on five prior decisions. One was a United
States Supreme Court case, which had dealt with a similar law ten
years earlier.1 2  The other four were Washington State Supreme
Court cases.183 The court used these cases to conclude that court
proceedings and documents could be closed only in exceptional
circumstances and that the closure had to be limited.'84 If possible,
the court should only close part of the hearing or trial instead of the
entire proceeding.' Sealed documents should be opened as soon as
possible; they could not be sealed indefinitely.8 6 A brief review the
five decisions relied on by the Washington Supreme Court is outlined
below.
178. Id. at 3.
179. See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.69A (1994).
180. Richard Seven, Child- Victim Shield Law Struck Down, SEATTLE TIMES, June 29,1992,
at C4; Associated Press, Judge Makes Permanent His Ban of New State Law, OREGONIAN, June
30, 1992, at D10. See also Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court at 1, Allied Daily Newspapers
v. Eikenberry (No. 92-2-12149-2) (Superior Court for King County, July 28, 1992).
181. 121 Wash. 2d 205, 848 P.2d 1258 (1993).
182. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 610-611 (1982).
183. Cohen v. Everett City Council, 85 Wash. 2d 385, 535 P.2d 801 (1975); Federated
Publications, Inc. v. Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d 51, 615 P.2d 440 (1980); Federated Publications, Inc.
v. Swedberg, 96 Wash. 2d 13, 633 P.2d 74 (1981); Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d
30, 640 P.2d 716 (1982).
184. See Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d at 37-39, 640 P.2d at 720-721.
185. See Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d at 64-65, 615 P.2d at 447.
186. See Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d at 39, 640 P.2d at 721.
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A. Precedents for Allied Daily Newspaper v. Eikenberry
1. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court
In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,'87 the United States
Supreme Court held that judges could not be required by statute to
close criminal proceedings because public access to government
proceedings is necessary in order for people to exercise their First
Amendment rights. 8
Globe began in 1979 when a Massachusetts Superior Court judge
closed several pretrial hearings and the entire trial of a man charged
with raping three teenage girls.189 The judge justified his actions by
referring to a Massachusetts law that required judges to bar the press
and members of the public from courtrooms during the testimony of
sexual assault victims who are under the age of eighteen.'9" The
Boston Globe, which was covering the trial, sought injunctive relief.'9'
A justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Court conducted an initial
hearing and denied the Globe's request.' 92 \Vhile the Boston Globe
was waiting for the Massachusetts Supreme Court to hear its appeal,
the rape trial ended.' 9' The man was acquitted. 94
On appeal, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the trial
judge had wrongly interpreted the Massachusetts law to require closure
of the entire trial if it involved juvenile sexual assault victims.' 9
Instead, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the law only
required the judge to close the court during the testimony of minor
victims.' 96 Judges could close additional parts of trials if they saw
fit, but that remained within the judge's discretion.' 97 The law was
meant to encourage child sexual assault victims to press charges and to
protect them from embarrassment once they did.' 98 The Boston
Globe appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which vacated the
187. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
188. See id. at 604-605.
189. Id. at 598.
190. Id. at 599 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16A (West 1981)).
191. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 599.
192. Id. at 599-600.
193. Id. at 600.
194. Id.
195. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 401 N.E.2d 360, 370 (Mass. 1980),
vacated, 449 U.S. 894.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 372.
198. Id. at 369.
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decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Court and remanded the
case.1 On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court stated that the mandatory closure rule
was constitutional in that it furthered a substantial state interest that
justified restricting the press's and public's access to the court-
room.
200
The Boston Globe appealed the Massachusetts decision to the
United States Supreme Court.20 1  In a six-three vote, the Court
overturned the state court's decision.20 2 The Court's opinion, written
by Justice Brennan, made it clear that court proceedings could be
closed only in exceptional circumstances. 203  The Court acknowl-
edged that access to courts is not guaranteed by the First Amendment,
but that the First Amendment is "broad enough to encompass those
rights that, while not unambiguously enumerated in the very terms of
the Amendment, are nonetheless necessary to the enjoyment of other
First Amendment rights. ''2°4  The First Amendment was intended
to foster discussion of government affairs among citizens. 25 Without
information about government proceedings, citizens have nothing to
discuss.206
In regard to criminal trials in particular, citizens have a right of
access because trials historically have been open and because access
helps citizens monitor the operations of the judicial system and
government as a whole.20 7 Justice Brennan stated:
Public scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the quality and safe-
guards the integrity of the fact finding process, with benefits to both
the defendant and to society as a whole. Moreover, public access to
the criminal trial fosters an appearance of fairness, thereby heighten-
ing public respect for the judicial process. And in the broadest
terms, public access to criminal trials permits the public to partici-
pate in and serve as a check upon the judicial process-an essential
component in our structure of self-government. In sum, the
199. Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court, 449 U.S. 894 (1980). The remand was to allow
the Massachusetts Supreme Court to consider the case in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). Id.
200. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 423 N.E.2d 773, 781 (1981), rev'd, 457 U.S.
596 (1982).
201. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 602.
202. Id. at 610-611.
203. Id. at 606.
204. Id. at 604.
205. See id. at 604-606.
206. See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604-605.
207. See id. at 605-606.
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institutional value of the open criminal trial is recognized in both
logic and experience."
The right of access is not absolute, but can be restricted only in
exceptional circumstances. 209  The Court did not find that the
circumstances of the rape trial justified mandatory restriction of access
in this case.210 The Massachusetts Supreme Court had given two
reasons to justify the law. First, closing courts during child sexual
assault victims' testimony spares them the embarrassment and trauma
of recounting the assault in front of others.211 Second, because it
spares these victims embarrassment, the law encourages them to press
charges and testify.212  The first reason is compelling, Justice Bren-
nan said, but "it does not justify a mandatory closure rule, for it is clear
that the circumstances of the particular case may affect the significance
of the interest. A trial court can determine on a case-by-case basis
whether closure is necessary to protect the welfare of the victim.
213
Further, as to the Massachusetts Supreme Court's second justification,
the United States Supreme Court found that there was no evidence to
support the claim that closing victims' testimony would encourage
them to report crimes.214 Justice Brennan noted:
Although [the statute] bars the press and general public from the
courtroom during the testimony of minor sex victims, the press is
not denied access to the transcript, court personnel, or any other
possible source that could provide an account of the minor victim's
testimony. Thus [the statute] cannot prevent the press from
publicizing the substance of a minor victim's testimony, as well as
his or her identity.21
If victims' willingness to testify depends on the state keeping that
testimony secret, the Massachusetts law was inadequate.216 Finally,
the Court said, even if the law furthered the state's interest in
encouraging victims to testify, it did so in a way that undermined the
208. Id. at 606 (footnotes omitted).
209. Id. at 606-607. The Court held that the right of access may only be denied where it
is necessitated "by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest." Id. at 607.
210. See id. at 607-608.
211. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 423 N.E.2d at 779.
212. Id.
213. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 608.
214. Id. at 609.




principle of open government.217 If child sex-crime victims were
allowed to testify in secret, other victims may ask to do so.2"' For
example, adult sex-crime victims probably suffer embarrassment and
trauma like child victims.2"9 If the state could close child victims'
testimony, it also could close adult victims' testimony.220
While the Court clearly said laws requiring judges to close
portions of court proceedings are unconstitutional, Chief Justice Burger
wrote a dissenting opinion that could have given supporters of the
Washington law hope.22' Justice Burger stated that the proper
inquiry was whether the proceeding historically had been open and
whether there was a substantial state interest that justified closing the
courtY 2 Justice Burger concluded that the majority had "ignored the
weight of historical practice." '223
While criminal trials historically have been open, trials involving
minors often have been closed.224 Justice Burger noted that our
society historically has protected minors charged with crime by
prohibiting the release of juvenile offenders' names, barring the press
and the public from juvenile court proceedings, and sealing juvenile
court records.22  While minors charged with crime have been
afforded protection, the majority opinion eliminated such protection for
child victims:2.6
Yet today the Court holds unconstitutional a state statute designed
to protect not the accused, but the minor victims of sex crimes. In
doing so, it advances a disturbing paradox. Although states are
permitted, for example, to mandate the closure of all proceedings in
order to protect a 17-year-old charged with rape, they are not
permitted to require the closing of part of criminal proceedings in
order to protect an innocent child who has been raped or otherwise
sexually abused.22
7
Supporters of the Washington bill used Justice Burger's argument
several times in testifying before the Washington legislature.228
217. See id.
218. See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 610.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. Id. at 616 (Burger, J., dissenting).
222. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 613-614 (Burger, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 614.
224. See id.
225. Id. at 612.
226. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 612 (Burger, J., dissenting).
227. Id. at 612.
228. Public hearing on S.H.B. 2348, supra note 20.
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However, Justice Burger's analysis of the intent of the Massachu-
setts statute distinguishes it from the intent of the Washington statute
and supports the notion that the Washington statute was unconstitu-
tional." 9 Justice Burger said the majority misunderstood the intent
of the Massachusetts law.230 The state did not want to deny report-
ers information about victims' testimony.2 3' This information would
be available in transcripts.132  Rather, Justice Burger said, the State
wanted to spare children the trauma and embarrassment of having to
testify in front of a large group of people.233 Massachusetts, accord-
ing to Justice Burger, was not trying to keep information secret for an
indefinite period of time. 4  In contrast, Washington legislators
wanted to keep victims' names secret permanently.
2 31
In addition to the Globe case, in reaching its decision in Allied
Daily Newspaper, the Washington Supreme Court considered a series
of its own decisions involving access to judicial proceedings.2 36
These cases are explained briefly below.
2. Cohen v. Everett City Council
In its first case dealing with media access to the judicial system,
the Washington Supreme Court in Cohen v. Everett City Council,
237
held that all members of the public, including reporters, have a right
to view documents entered as court evidence.23 ' This right exists
even if the documents could be sealed under other circumstances. 39
In the early 1970s, the Everett City Council revoked the city
license of a sauna parlor owner during a closed meeting. 240 The
sauna parlor owner appealed the city's decision to the Snohomish
County Superior Court. In making his appeal, the sauna parlor owner
got an order sealing the transcript of the city council meeting so that
229. See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 615-616 (Burger, J., dissenting).
230. See id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 616.
233. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 615 (Burger, J., dissenting).
234. See id. at 615-616.
235. See S.H.B. 2348; Public hearing on S.H.B. 2348, supra note 20; Senate Hearing on
S.H.B. 2348, supra note 102.
236. Allied Daily Newspapers, 121 Wash. 2d at 205, 848 P.2d at 1258; See also Cohen, 85
Wash. 2d at 385, 535 P.2d at 801; Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d at 51, 615 P.2d at 440; Swedberg, 96
Wash. 2d at 13, 633 P.2d at 74; Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d at 30, 640 P.2d at 716.
237. 85 Wash. 2d 385, 535 P.2d 801 (1975).
238. See id. at 390, 535 P.2d at 804.
239. See id. at 389, 535 P.2d at 803-804.
240. Id. at 386, 535 P.2d at 802.
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only the judge could see the file.241 During the city council's closed
meeting on the license, the sauna parlor owner had made some
allegations against another person, and the judge did not want those
accusations known. 42
The Everett Herald, a local newspaper, asked the judge to unseal
the record. 4 The judge refused "pending a hearing on the merits
of the action." '244 After reviewing the meeting record, the judge af-
firmed the council's decision to revoke the sauna parlor owner's license
and ordered the record sealed. 4 Again, the Everett Herald filed a
motion asking the judge to unseal the record, and again the judge
refused. 4 6  The paper then appealed directly to the Washington
Supreme Court. 47
Writing for the court in Cohen, Justice Brachtenbach opined that
the Washington State Constitution requires civil suits to be heard in
open court unless there is a statutory exception or a compelling reason
for closing the court.24  The council claimed that in this case there
was a statutory exception since records of executive sessions, or
legitimately closed meetings, are not public records under state
law.249  The Washington Supreme Court said that was true "[b]ut
the minutes lost their confidential nature when they became the basis
for judicial review on the merits. What is statutorily secret in one
context is not necessarily so when it moves into the judicial arena. "250
When the records became the basis for a lawsuit, they became the
equivalent of court testimony.
251
Further, Justice Brachtenbach said, there was no reason for the
records to be closed. 2  Concern about revealing the sauna parlor
owner's remarks was not a compelling state interest s.2 3  The court
therefore ordered the records opened. 5 4
241. Cohen, 85 Wash. 2d at 386, 535 P.2d at 802.
242. Id. at 388, 535 P.2d at 803.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 387, 535 P.2d at 802.
245. Cohen, 85 Wash. 2d at 387, 535 P.2d at 802.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 387, 535 P.2d at 802.
248. Id. at 387-388, 535 P.2d at 803.
249. Id. at 389, 535 P.2d at 804.
250. Cohen, 85 Wash. 2d at 389, 535 P.2d at 804.
251. Id.
252. See id. at 388-389, 535 P.2d at 803.
253. See id.
254. Cohen, 85 Wash. 2d at 390, 535 P.2d at 804.
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3. Federated Publications v. Kurtz
In Federated Publications v. Kurtz,25 5 which stemmed from a
heavily publicized murder trial, the Washington Supreme Court dealt
with media access to court proceedings and documents. 256 The court
held that judges could close pretrial hearings to protect defendants
from prejudicial publicity as long as the judges followed the five
guidelines enumerated by the court.
257
In November 1978, Elliott Tharp was charged with the murder
of William Ray Bond, a Port of Bellingham terminal manager.258
The Bellingham Herald, located in Whatcom County, covered the
case, 259 as did several local television and radio stations. Between
April 1978 and March 1979, the Bellingham Herald published sixteen
stories about the murder and the upcoming trial.26  As a result,
Whatcom County Superior Court Judge Jack Kurtz granted the
prosecutor a change of venue, moving the trial to neighboring Skagit
County.2 1  The change of venue was not adequate. Since about
1,000 of Skagit County's 63,000 residents read the Bellingham Herald
regularly, the jury pool could still be contaminated by people who
learned of the murder from the newspaper.262
The trial began on April 2, 1979, in Skagit County.263  In
March, Judge Kurtz held a suppression hearing in Whatcom County
to discuss whether the prosecutor could use the defendant's prior
criminal record and incriminating statements as evidence in the
trial.264 Duirng the suppression hearing, the prosecutor and defense
attorney moved the court to close the rest of the hearing and seal the
records. The motion was granted.265
After the trial began, the newspaper sued the judge, asking the
Washington Supreme Court to open the suppression hearing files and
255. 94 Wash. 2d 51, 615 P.2d 440 (1980).
256. See id. at 52-53, 615 P.2d at 441.
257. See id. at 62-65, 615 P.2d at 446-47.
258. Id. at 52, 615 P.2d at 441.
259. See, e.g., Becky Fox, Jo Tharp charged in Bond's murder, BELLINGHAM HERALD, Nov.
1, 1978, at Al; Becky Fox, Jury finds Tharp guilty in Bond death, BELLINGHAM HERALD, Apr.
12, 1979, at Al.
260. Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d at 52, 615 P.2d at 441.
261. Id. at 53, 615 P.2d at 441.
262. See id.
263. Id.




to prevent Judge Kurtz from closing future proceedings.266 A few
days later, Judge Kurtz opened the suppression hearing files without
prompting from the higher court.26 7  However, the supreme court
agreed to hear the case because the issue could come up again, and the
court wanted to give lower court judges guidelines to follow in similar
situations.68 Fifteen months after Judge Kurtz opened the hearing
files, the Washington Supreme Court issued an opinion supporting
Kurtz's initial decision to close the hearing and seal the files.269
In a similar case the year before, Gannett Company v. De
Pasquale,2 70 the U.S. Supreme Court had held that the public has a
right of access to suppression hearings, but that right is outweighed by
a defendant's right to a fair trial.27' In deciding Kurtz, the Washing-
ton Supreme Court referred to Gannett and held that because the case
before it was so factually similar to Gannett, "we are compelled to
conclude that respondent's closure order and order temporarily sealing
the file did not violate the United States Constitution.
272
However, the court continued, it would rather decide the case
based on Washington law than federal law because the Washington
State Constitution has a clause that specifically addresses the issue
while the United States Constitution does not.273 In Gannett, the
Supreme Court had not been able to agree on the source of the right
of access to judicial proceedings. 274 Four justices found the right in
the Sixth Amendment.27" Four did not.276  One found the right in
the First Amendment.277
In the Washington State Constitution, three clauses address the
issue.278 Article 1, section 5, which deals with the right to publish
266. Id. at 53-54, 615 P.2d at 441-442.
267. See id. at 54, 615 P.2d at 442.
268. Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d at 54, 615 P.2d at 442.
269. Id. at 56, 615 P.2d at 443.
270. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
271. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 393-394.
272. Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d at 56, 615 P.2d at 443.
273. Id. at 56, 58-59, 615 P.2d at 443-445.
274. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 379-380.
275. Justice Blackmun articulated a Sixth Amendment right of access in his dissenting
opinion, which Justices Brennan, White and Marshall signed. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 433, 446
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
276. The majority opinion, written by Justice Stewart, with whom Justices Burger, Powell,
Rehnquist and Stevens voted, denied a Sixth Amendment right of access. Id. at 379-380.
277. In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell identified a First Amendment right of access
to the suppression hearing. Id. at 397.
278. See WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 5 (freedom of speech), § 10 (administration of justice),
§ 22 (rights of the accused).
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on all subjects, is similar to the First Amendment. 279  Article I,
section 22, which deals with the right to public trials, mirrors the Sixth
Amendment.2 0  Article I, section 10 has no match in the federal
constitution.8 It reads, "Justice in all cases shall be administered
openly, and without unnecessary delay. ' 28 2  On that clause the
Washington Supreme Court based its decision in Kurtz."3
The Kurtz court held that the Washington State Constitution
clearly establishes the public's right of access to judicial proceedings,
but that right is not absolute.2s In some cases, judges must close
their courts in order to protect a criminal defendant's right to a fair
trial.28" The court must determine "whether the present circum-
stances were exceptional enough to justify closure. ' 286 To answer
that question, "the court needs workable standards that allow it to
strike a balance between the public's right of access and the accused's
rights to a fair trial including an impartial jury."287 To help judges
strike that balance, the court outlined the following test in determining
whether closure was justified: (1) the accused must show that an open
trial or hearing will likely jeopardize his or her ability to get a fair
trial;28 (2) anyone present when the closure motion is made must be
allowed to object;289 (3) the objector must demonstrate that there are
alternatives to closing the proceeding that will protect the accused's
rights;290 (4) the court must weigh the competing interests of the
accused and the public;291 and (5) the closure order cannot be any
broader than needed to serve its purpose.292 In other words, if the
279. The clause reads, "Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of that right." WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 5.
280. Washington's provision reads: "In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person, or by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to meet the witnesses
against him face to face, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his
own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense
is charged to have been committed and the right to appeal in all cases .... WASH. CONST. art.
1, § 22.
281. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
282. Id.
283. Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d at 59-60, 615 P.2d at 445.
284. Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d at 60, 615 P.2d at 445.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 61, 615 P.2d at 445.
288. Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d at 62, 615 P.2d at 446.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 63, 615 P.2d at 446.
291. Id. at 64, 615 P.2d at 447.
292. Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d at 64, 615 P.2d at 447.
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judge can protect the accused's rights by closing part of a hearing or
trial instead of all of it, he should close only part.2 93 If records from
the hearing are sealed, they should be opened as soon as possible.294
The supreme court held that Judge Kurtz had met these criteria
because he had closed only a portion of the suppression hearing,
opened records from the hearing soon after the jury was chosen, and
had reason to believe no alternative measures would protect the
defendant's right to a fair trial.295 In deciding Judge Kurtz had no
alternatives to closing the hearing, the court noted that the judge had
twice asked the Bellingham Herald not to publish information from
ballistic reports, and the newspaper published the information anyway,
violating the Washington Bench-Bar-Press Guidelines.296 Although
the Bellingham Herald's reporter promised to follow the Bench-Bar-
Press Guidelines, the newspaper's previous actions gave Judge Kurtz
no reason to believe it would not publish incriminating evidence from
the suppression hearing.297
4. Federated Publications v. Swedberg
A year after the Washington Supreme Court issued its opinion in
Kurtz, it heard Federated Publications v. Swedberg,298 in which the
Bellingham Herald sued a superior court judge for restricting access to
a suppression hearing.299  In Swedberg, the court held that because
judges can ban the public and media from court proceedings, they can
also institute other, less restrictive measures to control media coverage
of such proceedings.300
The Swedberg case arose from a criminal trial involving Veronica
Compton, the girlfriend of "Hillside Strangler" Kenneth Bianchi.
Bianchi was convicted of killing two women in Bellingham and five in
Los Angeles.30t  While he was in jail awaiting trial, Compton
293. See id.
294. See id.
295. Id. at 62-65, 615 P.2d at 446-447.
296. Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d at 63, 615 P.2d at 447. Bench-Bar-Press Principles and Guidelines
are developed by reporters, lawyers, and judges and outline how all parties shall behave during
trials. Adherence to the guidelines is voluntary. The purpose is to curtail prejudicial pretrial
publicity. See generally THE BENCH-BAR-PRESS COMMITTEE OF WASHINGTON, BENCH-BAR-
PRESS PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES (1974) [hereinafter BENCH-BAR-PRESS GUIDELINES].
297. Id.
298. 96 Wash. 2d 13, 633 P.2d 74 (1981).
299. Id. at 15, 633 P.3d at 75.
300. See id. at 22-23, 633 P.2d at 78.
301. 'Copycat Strangler' One of Two Escapees, SEATTLE TIMES, July 27, 1988, at D1.
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attempted to kill a Bellingham cocktail waitress to divert suspicion
from Bianchi. 2
Before Compton's trial, a suppression hearing was held in
Whatcom County Superior Court.0 3 Compton's attorney asked the
judge to close the court because media coverage of the hearing might
prejudice jurors.3"" Judge Byron Swedberg considered closing the
hearing but decided to keep it open if reporters covering the hearing
would sign an agreement to abide by Washington's Bench-Bar-Press
Guidelines.3 °3 Reporters from the Bellingham Herald and a few other
news organizations refused to sign the agreement and were asked to
leave the courtroom.0 6 The Bellingham Herald then sued Judge
Swedberg, alleging that requiring reporters to sign an agreement on
how they will cover a hearing before they attend that hearing consti-
tutes prior restraint.
30 7
The Washington Supreme Court disagreed.308 The court said
Judge Swedberg followed the guidelines outlined in Kurtz and
determined that closing the suppression hearing would be the only way
to prevent prejudicial publicity without infringing on Compton's
rights. 39  A continuance or change of venue might have alleviated
the dangers of pretrial publicity, but those options required Compton
to give up her right to a speedy trial and right to be tried in the county
where the offense was committed. 310  Then the court said if Judge
Swedberg could justifiably close the hearing, he could take other, less
drastic action.31 Justice Rosellini wrote:
Ordinarily, members of the media who have declared their adher-
ence to the guidelines do exercise restraint in such reporting, but it
had been the experience of the trial judge here that mere oral
commitment had not sufficed to produce that restraint. He
recognized that by admitting members of the press to such a
sensitive proceeding, even upon their written agreement to be guided
by these standards, he was placing the defendant's interests in some
jeopardy. Yet he was willing to try this method of securing
compliance, as an experiment, to see if it would be effective in
302. Id.
303. Swedberg, 96 Wash. 2d at 15, 633 P.2d at 74.
304. Id. at 14-15, 633 P.2d at 74-75.
305. Id. See BENCH-BAR-PRESS GUIDELINES, supra note 296.
306. Swedberg, 96 Wash. 2d at 15, 633 P.2d at 75.
307. See id. at 15-16, 633 P.2d at 75.
308. Id. at 22-23, 633 P.2d at 78.
309. See id. at 16-21, 633 P.2d at 75-78.
310. See id. at 17, 633 P.2d at 75-76.
311. Swedberg, 96 Wash. 2d at 22, 633 P.2d at 78.
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protecting the defendant while at the same time allowing the public,
including the media, to attend the hearing. As we view this
measure, it was a good faith attempt to accommodate the interests
of both defendant and press which, hopefully, would prove both
practical and effective as an alternative to closure.312
Justice Rosellini also said the court did not consider requiring the
media to sign an agreement to abide by the Bench-Bar-Press Guide-
lines a prior restraint because the guidelines "are, by definition, not a
set of rules but rather principles which guide the courts, lawyers and
court personnel, as well as the media ... ."313 Most of the guide-
lines are general suggestions and don't address the specific content of
stories, although a few suggest not publishing items such as opinions
about defendants' guilt or innocence, defendants' confessions and
results of polygraph and ballistic tests.3
14
Justice Dolliver wrote a vehement dissent on this point, saying
conditioning admission to the hearing on a promise to obey the
guidelines was a prior restraint, and Judge Swedberg had not met the
burden of proof needed to exercise prior restraint." 5 While the
Compton case would certainly receive a great deal of publicity,
Dolliver wrote, the judge had no reason to believe it would be
sensational, prejudicial or in violation of the Bench-Bar-Press Guide-
lines given the coverage up to that point.316 He implied that the
judge should have looked at media coverage of that particular case and
not at media coverage of trials generally.317
5. Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa
A year after the Washington Supreme Court decided Swedberg, it
heard Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa,318 its first case involving a
closure order that was not entirely based on a threat to the defendant's
right to a fair trial.31 9 The court held that judges could close judicial
proceedings for reasons other than to protect defendants from
prejudicial publicity, but they must demonstrate a greater need for
closure in those cases than in cases where a defendant's Sixth Amend-
312. Id. at 21, 633 P.2d at 78.
313. Id. at 20-21, 633 P.2d at 77.
314. See BENCH-BAR-PRESs GUIDELINES, supra note 296 at 7, 10.
315. Swedberg, 96 Wash. 2d at 27-28, 633 P.2d at 81-82 (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
316. Id. at 27, 633 P.2d at 82.
317. See id.
318. 97 Wash. 2d 30, 640 P.2d 716 (1982).
319. Id. at 36-37, 640 P.2d at 720.
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ment right to a fair trial is threatened. 30  The state supreme court
modified the criteria for closure it established in the first Bellingham
Herald case, creating the test that would be used in Allied Daily
Newspapers. 321
The Ishikawa case arose from a 1981 murder trial that was not
particularly celebrated.2 Just before the trial, the defendant's lawyer
made a motion to dismiss the case.323 He also asked the judge to
close the courtroom while the motion was being heard.3 24  After
discussing the issue with the defense attorney and prosecutor in his
chambers, King County Superior Court Judge Richard Ishikawa agreed
to close the court while the lawyers argued the motion to dismiss. 5
In announcing his decision, Judge Ishikawa did not explain why he
agreed to close the hearing.3 26 He did allow the press to object and
to present alternatives to closure, but it was difficult for the media to
do so when they didn't know why the court was being closed.327
The judge heard arguments for the motion to dismiss, denied the
motion and sealed the hearing record.328 The trial was held, and the
defendant was convicted of murder. 29  After the trial, the Seattle
Times and Seattle Post-Intelligencer again asked the judge to unseal
records from the pretrial hearing. 330 The judge refused, and the
newspapers appealed directly to the Washington Supreme Court.33 '
Because Judge Ishikawa had not explained his reasons for closing
the pretrial hearing and sealing the records, the supreme court ordered
him to explain his reasons before it heard oral arguments.332 Judge
Ishikawa said he closed the hearing and sealed the documents to
protect the defendant's right to a fair trial, avoid interference with a
continuing investigation of the murder, and protect witnesses'
safety.333
In its decision, the supreme court said it would expand the Kurtz
test because Judge Ishikawa had not closed the hearing simply to
320. See id.
321. See id.
322. See Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d at 32-33, 640 P.2d at 717-718.
323. Id. at 32, 640 P.2d at 717.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 33, 640 P.2d at 718.




330. Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d at 33, 640 P.2d at 718.
331. Id. at 34, 640 P.2d at 718.
332. Id. at 39-40, 640 P.2d at 721-722.
333. Id. at 40, 640 P.2d at 721.
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protect the defendant's fair-trial rights and the court believed "that
closure to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial should be treated
somewhat differently from closure based entirely on the protection of
other interests . . . ."34 The court then outlined the following test
to determine if closure was justified: First, the proponent of closure
must make some showing of need. Defendants need only show a
"likelihood of jeopardy" to their Sixth Amendment rights. Other
people have a higher burden of proof. They must show a "serious and
imminent threat to some other important interest. '331 Second,
anyone present when the motion to close the court or seal documents
is made must be allowed to object, and the person arguing for closure
must give specific reasons for wanting closure so other people "have
sufficient information to be able to appreciate the damages which
would result from free access to the proceeding and/or records. This
knowledge would enable the potential objector to better evaluate
whether or not to object and on what grounds to base its opposi-
tion. ' '3  Third, all parties must analyze whether the proposal for
closure is the least restrictive means available for protecting the
threatened interests.337 Fourth, judges must weigh the competing
interests of the defendant and public and explain their findings and
conclusions. 3 ' Finally, the closure order must be as limited as
possible. If it involves sealed documents, it must expire at a specific
time unless the person asking for closure comes back to court at that
time and gives a reason why the order should be extended.339
The court, in an opinion written by Justice Brachtenbach, then
argued that Judge Ishikawa had not met these guidelines. 34  Ishi-
kawa did not tell the newspapers why the hearing and documents were
going to be sealed, which deprived them of a reasonable opportunity
to suggest alternatives to closure. 341  Further, Ishikawa did not
explain his consideration of the defendant's and public's competing
interests.3" He did not explain why other alternatives were not
adequate, and he gave no reason to believe that closing the entire
hearing and sealing the records indefinitely was the least restrictive
334. Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d at 37, 640 P.2d at 719.
335. Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d at 37, 640 P.2d at 720.
336. Id. at 38, 640 P.2d at 720.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d at 39, 640 P.2d at 721.
340. See id. at 39-45, 640 P.2d at 721-724.
341. Id. at 41, 640 P.2d at 722.
342. Id. at 45, 640 P.2d at 724.
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means of achieving his goals.343 The supreme court sent the case
back to Judge Ishikawa, ordering him to follow the new guidelines in
reconsidering the newspapers' motion to open the records.344
Globe, Cohen, Kurtz, Swedberg, and Ishikawa suggested that
Washington's victim identification law was unconstitutional.34 Globe
held that laws requiring judges to close court proceedings were
unacceptable and that such proceedings could be closed only in
exceptional cases. 346  The Washington decisions also emphasized the
importance of conducting judicial proceedings in public.347 Cohen
established a public right to view documents submitted as evi-
dence. 48 Kurtz, Swedberg and Ishikawa emphasized the need for
caution in closing court proceedings.3 49  These three cases stressed
the importance of carefully considering arguments in favor of open
hearings before mandating closure. In Allied Daily Newspapers, the
State tried to argue that the rape-victim identification law allowed
judges to consider arguments for keeping court proceedings open, but
Allied's lawyers, several district attorneys and at least two superior
court judges believed that the law was written in a way that mandated
closure and thus brought the law into conflict with established
precedent.350
Further, a study of state legislative history supports the assertion
that the legislators meant to require public officials to keep child
victims' names from the public."' Therefore, while the specific
wording of the statute may not have conflicted with the standards in
Globe, Cohen, Kurtz, Swedberg, and Ishikawa, the legislators' intent
was to mandate closure. At the very least, the intent of the law
violated the Washington Supreme Court's established guidelines and
was unconstitutional.
343. Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d at 45, 640 P.2d at 724.
344. Id. at 45-46, 640 P.2d at 724.
345. See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 596; Cohen, 85 Wash. 2d at 385, 535 P.2d at 801;
Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d at 51, 615 P.2d at 440; Swedberg, 96 Wash. 2d at 13, 633 P.2d at 74;
Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d at 30, 640 P.2d at 716.
346. See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606-607.
347. Cohen, 85 Wash. 2d at 387-388, 535 P.2d at 803; Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d at 59-60, 615
P.2d at 445; Swedberg, 96 Wash. 2d at 20, 633 P.2d at 77; Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d at 36, 640 P.2d
at 719.
348. See Cohen, 85 Wash. 2d. at 389-390, 535 P.2d at 803-804.
349. See Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d at 60, 615 P.2d at 445; Swedberg, 96 Wash. 2d at 20, 633
P.2d at 77; Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d at 37, 640 P.2d at 720.
350. See Allied Daily Newspapers, 121 Wash. 2d at 211-214, 848 P.2d at 1261-1262.




B. Oral Arguments for Allied Daily Newspapers v. Eikenberry
During oral arguments for Allied Daily Newspapers v. Eiken-
berry,3"2 the court focused on the practical effects of the victim
identification law instead of the legal precedents. Decisions in earlier
cases indicated how the court might rule in Allied Daily Newspapers
and the justices' questions during oral argument clearly demonstrated
their position in the matter.353  The court allowed Stephen Hassett,
an assistant attorney general representing the State, some opening
remarks about the legislature's intent and the harms the law was
supposed to abate. The court then launched into questions highlight-
ing the weakest points in the State's argument.354 In contrast, it
presented Cameron DeVore, the attorney representing Allied Daily
Newspapers, and Virginia Kirk, who represented the King County
Prosecutor, with questions that allowed them to elaborate and
strengthen their arguments.
35
All parties made essentially the same arguments as they had in the
trial court hearings. 3 6  Hassett emphasized the need to protect
children and encourage reporting of sex crimes.35 7 DeVore claimed
that by requiring judges to close court proceedings the law violated the
state constitution's clauses pertaining to open justice, freedom of
speech, right to due process and separation of powers. 38 Kirk said
the law required prosecutors to ask for closed court proceedings and
interfered with their ability to successfully prosecute cases.359
Hassett explained the legislature's desire to pass a law that would
protect children from harm and encourage them to report sex
crimes.360 As he began to discuss the chilling effect that publicizing
victims' names might have on families' willingness to report sex
352. 121 Wash. 2d 205, 848 P.2d 1258 (1993).
353. There is no transcript of the oral arguments. Copies of the hearing tapes can be
obtained from the Washington Supreme Court's administrator for a nominal fee or can be heard
free of charge at the administrator's office. Tape of Oral Arguments in Allied Daily Newspapers
v. Eikenberry (No. 59435-0), held by the Washington Supreme Court, Olympia, WA [hereinafter
Tape of Oral Arguments].
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id.; See also Brief of Appellants, supra note 145; Brief of Respondent (Maleng), Allied
Daily Newspapers v. Eikenberry, 121 Wash. 2d 205, 848 P.2d 1258 (1992) (No. 59435-0)
[hereinafter Brief of Maleng]; Brief of Respondents, supra note 140.
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crimes, a justice interrupted him to ask if the statute was aimed at one
newspaper.361
Hassett replied that although only one newspaper currently named
child victims of sex crimes, the legislature intended the statute to apply
to all news organizations. 362 "The legislature, seeing actual harm
taking place to those children, was compelled to act, correctly so, and
simply cannot rely on the good graces of other media outlets in this
state to continue the policies they've had in the past," Hassett said.
"These policies can change. There may be pressures if one newspaper
does it, another may feel compelled to do this.
3 63
Another justice immediately asked him what evidence the state
had of harm to children.36  Hassett referred to the hearing testimony
of parents, counselors, and the Mason County deputy prosecutor,
whereupon the justice asked if there was any medical testimony.
365
Hassett replied that the counselors' testimony could be considered
medical testimony since it showed psychological harm.366 Some help
was provided by a justice who stepped in and noted an anecdote from
one of the depositions that told of a child victim being taunted on the
playground by children who said that if she had had sex with one
person, she could have sex with them.
67
The court would come back to the issue of harm later, but at that
point it moved on and asked if the new law required judges to close
court proceedings. 36' This was the main point made by Allied Daily
Newspapers, who used the Globe decision to point out that mandatory
closure was not constitutional. 369  Hassett's answer indicates he was
aware of the state's vulnerability on this issue:
Probably the key words in the statute and in this controversy are the
words that 'the court shall ensure that the information identifying
the child victim is not disclosed to the press or the public.' If we
take the position of the media respondents that those words mandate
closure, then we would have to concede they have a point. The
361. Unfortunately, there is no way to tell from the tapes which justice asked a particular
question. It is possible to tell which lawyer is speaking because they introduce themselves at the












state does not concede that point. We feel that the court can ensure
that the identifying information is not disclosed without closing the
case every time.37'
Attorneys and judges could use the victim's first name, initials or
a pseudonym, Hassett said.3 7' He noted prosecutors from two
counties had said that substituting initials or fake names would confuse
children and make it difficult to prosecute cases, but these prosecutors
didn't have to deal with news organizations that publish child victims'
names.372  These alternatives to closing the court might not be
feasible in cases involving young children, but they could be used with
teenage victims, Hassett said.373
One justice questioned Hassett's interpretation of the law and
referred to the prosecutors' affidavits. "They're both prosecutors," the
justice said. "They've been before this court. They're knowledgeable
about this specific area. They're saying under their view the law
requires mandatory closure in every instance. How do you refute
that?374
Again, Hassett said these prosecutors had no incentive to
creatively apply the statute since they didn't have to deal with a
newspaper like the Journal.375 It was obvious, however, he was
having difficulty on this point, and DeVore and Kirk latched on to that
weakness in their arguments. 3 71 "What has happened here is that the
legislature has impermissibly put its thumb on the scales of justice and
has decided how matters that have been left to the careful balancing
and wise discretion of the trial courts are going to come out in these
circumstances," DeVore said.
37 7
The new law could have been written in an acceptable way,
DeVore continued, but "the legislature just didn't do it right.
371
DeVore asserted that if the law had stated the child victim's privacy
was an important issue that should be considered with other rights, it
probably would have been acceptable. However, the law uses the word
"shall" in saying courts shall prevent victims' names from becoming
370. Tape of Oral Arguments, supra note 353.
371. Id.; See also Brief of Appellants, supra note 145, at 15-16.
372. Tape of Oral Arguments, supra note 353.
373. Id.
374. Id.
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known, and that forecloses any kind of balancing of interests, DeVore
said. 3
79
Kirk, speaking on behalf of the King County prosecutor,
supported DeVore's statements.38 ° She noted that while prosecutors
differed on how much of a trial would have to be closed, they agreed
that some of each trial involving a child sex-crime victim would be
held in secret.381 She referred to the affidavit of Mason County's
deputy prosecutor, who supported the law. "Even where this practice
has been going on for some time in Mason County, the prosecutor
there who handles these cases still believes that there's no other way to
comply with this law, other than closure and excluding the media at
least during the time when the child is testifying," Kirk said.382 Kirk
and DeVore also claimed that if child sex-crime victims were given
special consideration under the law, other victims would ask for similar
protection of their privacy.383 "I think that would only add another
layer of difficulty and problems to our effective prosecution of criminal
cases," Kirk said.3
84
When a justice asked Hassett if the law would be stretched to
apply to other victims, Hassett said he could not give a conclusive
answer. 385  The law specifically addressed child sex-crime victims,
but a clever attorney probably could find a way to make it apply to
other victims, he said.38 6
During the oral arguments, it was evident that the court's main
concern was that the law required judges to close court proceedings in
violation of the open justice provision of the state constitution and the
Ishikawa guidelines. DeVore and Kirk fed this concern by saying that
not only did the law require closure but that judges and district
attorneys already had interpreted and applied the law as a mandatory
closure rule. Hassett simply could not provide assurance that the law
would be applied in a way consistent with the Ishikawa guidelines.
Nor could he provide documented evidence of harm to the children
named in news stories. Anecdotal evidence apparently was not enough
to persuade the court that the state interest in protecting the children's










privacy should outweigh the interest in maintaining open judicial
proceedings.
The key moment in the oral arguments came when a justice
interrupted Hassett's explanation of why the law was needed when the
Ishikawa test provided a mechanism for judges to close court proceed-
ings.387  "I think the practical reality is that there's nobody at the
time of the trial or .in the pretrial proceeding who's necessarily going
to raise the issue on behalf of the child," Hassett said, explaining that
prosecutors fear asking for a closed hearing because it provides grounds
for an appeal, and defense attorneys won't raise the issue because they
want the victim to be uncomfortable.3"'
At that point, a justice interjected: "Counselor, before you move
on too far, could you comment on what you want us to do with Article
1, section 10, of our state constitution that says, quote, justice in all
cases shall be administered openly, close quote. What do we do with
that?"38 9
C. The Washington Supreme Court's Decision
On April 1, 1993, the day before the one-year anniversary of the
bill's enactment, the Washington Supreme Court declared Section 9 of
the victim identification law unconstitutional. 39  The opinion,
written by Justice Guy, side-stepped the issues of freedom of speech,
right to due process and separation of powers.391 It did not discuss
the First or Fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution.392
The court focused instead on the fact that the state constitution
explicitly guaranteed the open administration of justice. The court felt
that the victim identification law could interfere with that.39 3 Justice
Guy wrote:
We adhere to the constitutional principle that it is the right of
the people to access open courts where they may freely observe the
administration of civil and criminal justice. Openness of courts is
essential to the courts' ability to maintain public confidence in the




390. Allied Daily Newspapers, 121 Wash. 2d at 207, 848 P.2d at 1259.
391. See id. at 209, 848 P.2d at 1260.
392. See id.
393. See id. at 211, 848 P.2d at 1261.
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the ultimate protector of liberty, property, and constitutional
integrity.
394
The right of access is not absolute, the court continued, so courts
must apply the Ishikawa test when there is a question about whether
to close proceedings or documents. 395 Applying the first part of the
test, protecting child victims from further harm is a compelling state
interest and "on an individualized basis may be sufficient to warrant
court closure. ' 396  However, the court adopted Allied Daily News-
papers' and county prosecutors' interpretation of the law.397  The
problem, the court said, was that the victim identification law required
judges to close court proceedings whenever a child victim's identity
might be revealed, thus preventing judges from considering individual
cases on their merits.398 Indeed, whether the victim needed anonym-
ity was irrelevant according to the law.39  Justice Guy noted, "In
this way, a trial court might be forced to close its doors and to seal
records when the child's psychological maturity, the nature of the
crime, and the child's and the relatives' wishes regarding closure all
warrant keeping the trial open. "400
Further, the court said, the law restricts people's ability to object
to court closure and to offer alternatives.40' It requires judges to
protect victims' privacy regardless of the other interests that the
objectors or the judges themselves might suggest. The law makes it
nearly impossible to narrowly tailor closure orders since it places no
time limit on the sealing of court documents. 40 2  The law does not
allow trial courts to comply with the Ishikawa guidelines in any way,
the court concluded.0 3
Allied Daily Newspapers and State attorneys had limited most of
their arguments over the law to Section 9. Section 9 referred to closing
court proceedings and documents that had traditionally been open and
was the section that King County Superior Court Judge Norman
Quinn had found unconstitutional. 4 However, Allied Daily News-
papers' attorneys had also argued that other sections of the law might




398. Allied Daily Newspapers, 121 Wash. 2d at 211, 848 P.2d at 1261.
399. See id.
400. Id. at 212, 848 P.2d at 1262.
401. Id.
402. See Allied Daily Newspapers, 121 Wash. 2d at 212, 848 P.2d at 1262.
403. Id.
404. See id. at 213-214, 848 P.2d at 1262.
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be unconstitutional.05 The Washington Supreme Court chose not
to make a decision on those sections of the law because the trial court
had found them constitutional and the attorneys for Allied Daily
Newspapers did not appeal that ruling.40 6  Thus, Sheldon's law
would still apply to government documents and proceedings that were
not considered "traditionally open," such as police and juvenile court
records.407
The Washington Supreme Court's verdict was a foregone
conclusion according to several of the people associated with the
case. 40 8 DeVore, who had worked on the Kurtz and Ishikawa cases,
said the media organizations could not have lost.4,9  Even if the
Washington State Constitution had not explicitly called for open court
proceedings, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Globe would have
required the state court to declare the law void according to the federal
constitution or face having the U.S. Supreme Court reverse its
decision.4 10 "We had two strings in our bow," DeVore said.4"
V. CONCLUSION
The saga of Tim Sheldon's victim identification law shows why
the law cannot be taken for granted as a protector of individuals' civil
liberties. The law should represent interests or rights which Americans
collectively have agreed are important. Yet statutory law is created by
politicians who may be willing to sacrifice the enduring values
embodied in a constitution's civil liberties clauses for short-term
political gains. Since statutes must apply to all citizens equally,
legislative action often does not leave room for the careful balancing of
interests that is needed in dealing with social problems such as the
dispute over public identification of sex-crime victims.
Americans have agreed that the ability to monitor and criticize
government is important.412 Having had experience with the British
system, which allowed punishment for criticism of government and,
405. Id.
406. Allied Daily Newspaper, 121 Wash. 2d at 214, 848 P.2d at 1262.
407. See id.; See also S.H.B. 2348, ch. 188, § 7 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§ 13.50.050(25)), § 8 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 10.97.130), 52nd Leg., 1992 Wash. Laws
822-826.
408. Telephone Interview with Roland Thompson, supra note 94; Telephone Interview with
Cameron DeVore, attorney for Allied Daily Newspapers (Apr. 23, 1996).
409. Telephone Interview with Cameron DeVore, supra note 408.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 16-17
(Atheneum 1969) (1941).
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during some periods, secret trials, the authors of the federal Constitu-
tion and Bill of Rights feared the United States' government could
become equally oppressive.413 The American system gave citizens
the power to vote government officials out of office if they failed to
represent the people. However, in order to vote wisely, citizens needed
information about government action and public issues. By guarantee-
ing freedom of speech and press, the authors of the Bill of Rights
hoped to enable Americans to become informed about government
affairs, discuss them openly and reach a consensus about how public
issues should be handled.414 In 1787, Thomas Jefferson wrote to a
friend:
The basis of our governments being the opinion of the people, the
very first object should be to keep that right; and were it left to me
to decide whether we should have a government without newspa-
pers, or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a
moment to prefer the latter.41
Early Americans were interested in fostering openness in the
judicial system. Many were familiar with the Star Chamber, a British
court that held secret, political trials during the reigns of the Tudors
and early Stuarts.416 During the colonial period, the courts were no
less abusive than other parts of the government, and in some ways,
may have been more so.417 Legal scholar William Nelson explains,
"Because there was no modem bureaucracy, the judiciary and the
officials responsible to it (e.g., sheriffs) were the primary link between
a colony's central government and its outlying localities. The judiciary
alone could coerce individuals by punishing crimes and imposing
money judgments."41
413. Id. at 21, 29.
414. See generally FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON: EARLY
AMERICAN LIBERTARIAN THEORIES (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1966).
415. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON: EARLY AMERICAN LIBERTARIAN THEORIES 333 (Leonard W.
Levy ed., 1966).
416. See Letter from the New York Gazette in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER
TO JEFFERSON: EARLY AMERICAN LIBERTARIAN THEORIES 108 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1966).
See generally CORA L. SCOFIELD, A STUDY OF THE COURT OF STAR CHAMBER (1900);
FREDRICK S. SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND 1476-1776: THE RISE AND
DECLINE OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL (1965).
417. See William E. Nelson, The Jury and Consensus Government in Mid-Eighteenth-
Century America, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDER-




The Sixth Amendment guarantee of a public trial and, according
to some scholars, the First Amendment guarantee of a free press were
intended to prevent miscarriages of justice, such as those that occurred
in British courts. 419  Many states through their constitutions and
statutes, have also established their own guarantees of freedom of the
press, open trials and access to government information. As discussed
previously, the authors of Washington's constitution were quite
deliberate and diligent in guaranteeing open justice in this state.42 °
The constitutional guarantees of access to state judicial proceed-
ings and documents cannot be taken for granted. As one can see in the
actions of Washington's legislators in passing the child-victim
identification bill, lawmakers may see more political opportunity to be
gained from limiting citizens' civil rights than protecting them.
Majority opinion fuels American government. Public officials are
aware that they must at some point be re-elected or re-appointed.
Therefore, lawmakers may find it in their interest to pass laws that in
effect punish unpopular minorities in order to win the approval of the
majority. The public disapproval of the Shelton-Mason County
Journal's practices in naming child sex-crime victims made it an
attractive target for legislators seeking to win public support in an
election year. Legislators could effectively cut off the Journal's, and
other media's, access to information about child victims and win public
approval for protecting children while remaining free from repercus-
sions about the law's restrictiveness, as most ordinary voters have little
reason to attend or look up records of court proceedings.
It is tempting to believe that the Shelton-Mason County Journal
brought such a government assault on itself by exposing child victims
to public scrutiny and possible harassment. In other instances in
which Washington media and law enforcement officials have clashed
over media coverage of judicial proceedings, the Washington Bench-
Bar-Press Association's mediation committee, called the "fire brigade,"
has been able to engender compromises between judges who fear
publicity will interfere with their ability to conduct a trial, and
journalists who fear losing their access to court proceedings.421 In
1990, for instance, the brigade moderated a disagreement between the
judge handling the Westley Dodd murder trial and a newspaper that
419. See Gannett, 443 U.S. at 422.
420. See Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d at 59-60, 615 P.2d at 445.
421. Telephone Interview with Justice Alexander, Washington Supreme Court Justice (Apr.
15, 1996).
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published some of Dodd's writings.422 In Mason County, mediation
was never attempted. Washington Supreme Court Justice Gerry
Alexander, a former Mason County Superior Court judge and
chairman of the fire brigade during the early 1990s, said to the best of
his knowledge mediation was never considered by court officers in
Mason County, probably because it only works when the parties are
willing to compromise.4 23  The Gays gave no indication of a willing-
ness to compromise, Alexander said.424
Yet the plaintiffs in most of the cases that have given teeth to the
First Amendment have been more unpopular and disagreeable than the
Gays.425 They have included Ku Klux Klan members, religious
dissidents and newspapermen so vitriolic they offended nearly every
segment of their community.426 Because the courts are more insulat-
ed from public opinion than the legislature, they are more able to
address issues of civil liberties according to agreed-upon principles as
opposed to current sentiment. Legal scholar Henry Abraham has said
the courts are the last protectors of American civil liberties, and in the
latter part of this century, the courts have protected unpopular citizens
from sometimes-popular government restrictions upon them.427 In
Washington, this was certainly the case as the courts protected the
press's and public's access to court proceedings even in the face of
popular opposition.
422. While he was in jail awaiting trial, Dodd, who eventually plead guilty to murdering
three young boys and was executed, wrote a booklet that supposedly told children how to avoid
sexual predators. He then gave the booklet to a newspaper in Vancouver, Washington, to
publish. The judge handling Dodd's trial feared the publication would prejudice potential jurors
and called the Washington Bench-Bar-Press Association. After much discussion, the newspaper
published the booklet. While the judge and the prosecutor did not agree with the decision, they
respected it, and the newspaper was able to retain access to future court proceedings. Rob
Phillips, A Child Murderer Grants an Exclusive, QUILL, Sept. 1990, at 19-22.
423. Telephone Interview with Gerry Alexander, supra note 421.
424. Id.
425. See generally CHAFEE, supra note 412.
426. See generally Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (holding an Ohio statute
prohibiting advocacy of the use of force violated the First Amendment and could not be used to
convict the leader of a Ku Klux Klan group for holding a rally); West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding a West Virginia statute compelling
students to salute the flag violated the First Amendment and could not be used to expel Jehovah's
witnesses from school); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 723 (1931) (holding unconstitutional
a Minnesota statute enjoining the publication of a "malicious, scandalous and defamatory"
newspaper).
427. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIARY: THE SUPREME COURT IN THE GOVERN-
ENTAL PROCESS 53 (5th ed. 1980).
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Still, the courts do not veer far from public opinion.42 Without
enforcement power of its own, the judiciary must rely on the executive
branch and the power of public opinion to execute its rulings.
Therefore, proponents of freedom of the press and open access to
government-held information should not stand too comfortably in the
shadow of the courts' protection. Instead, advocates of open govern-
ment and freedom of the press should help educate the public on the
enduring need for openness in government and unhindered publication,
even when such openness and freedom results in offensive material.
For if the public does not demand access to government-held
information and the freedom to exchange that information, legislators
surely will be tempted to cut off public access to sensitive information
when such restrictions seem politically expedient.
428. Id. at 202-203.
19971
